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NOTES AND COMMENTS 393
Logically, and considering the similarity between park maintenance
and the maintenance of health and schools, which are practically unan-
imously held to be governmental functions, the governmental classifica-
tion seems to be the sounder of the two views if the distinction between
governmental and proprietary function is to be strictly followed. How-
ever, as the immunity doctrine is apparently inequitable, as shown by
the tendency of the courts to impose liability wherever possible, the im-
position of liability by statutory enactment, and the opinions of writers
on the subject, it appears that substantial justice will be more satisfac-
torily served if the Supreme Court of North Carolina rules the main-
tenance of a park a proprietary function.
S. J. STERN, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Payment-Cashier's Check.
Defendant, manufacturer of motor cars, notified plaintiff-distributor
that "driveaways" must be settled for by cashier's check before the cars
would be delivered. Dealer, ordering through plaintiff, procured
cashier's check payable to defendant and delivered same to defendant
coincident with delivery of cars. The account of distributor was
credited with the amount of the check which was deposited with prompt-
ness in a Wisconsin bank for collection; thence it was sent to a Federal
Reserve Bank and then to drawee bank. Drawee stamped check paid,
charged the amount on its own books against its deposit with the Re-
serve Bank, and sent a credit memorandum to the latter bank which
failed to credit same to drawee's account. Drawee became insolvent,
and after successive charges back by the banks to its account, defendant
charged the amount of the cashier's check back to plaintiff. Held, the
check constituted payment.1
With the exception of a few jurisdictions2 the authorities are
unanimous in support of the rule that the giving of a bank check by a
debtor for the payment of his indebtedness to the payee is not, in the
absence of an express or implied agreement to that effect, a payment or
discharge of the debt. There is a presumption that the check is accepted
on condition that it be paid, and the debt is not discharged until the
check is paid or until it is accepted at the bank at which it is made pay-
able.3 The reason sometimes assigned is that the paper is given and
Nash Motors Co. v. J. M. Harrison and Co., 183 S. E. 202 (Ga. 1935).
-Dille v. White, 132 Iowa, 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906) (a contrary rule has been
announced in Massachusetts, Maine, and Indiana where the giving of a check,
note, or draft for a debt or obligation to pay money is held to operate as a payment
or extinguishment of the obligation).
Ketcham v. Hines, 29 Ga. App. 627, 116 S. E. 225 (1923) (bank checks are
not payment until themselves paid, without an express agreement that they are to
be accepted as such); Dille v. White, 132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906);
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received upon the mutual understanding of the parties that it represents
actual value to its full nominal amount and that on due presentation to
the drawee it will be honored. It is only upon its being thus honored
that the payment become effective and absolute.4 Even in the jurisdic-
tions first referred to above it is held to be a rule of presumption only,
and the intention of the parties when expressly declared or when shown
by collateral facts and circumstances will be allowed to prevail.5
Whether there is such an agreement is to be determined by the intent
of the parties, 6 and it is a question of fact for the jury7 to ascertain from
the circumstances.8 Thus the majority of courts seem to be in accord
with the general rule, but a divergence occurs when they attempt to
ascertain, in the light of the facts of each individual case, whether there
is an express or implied agreement to accept a negotiable instrument as
payment. Some courts follow the view that the mere expression of a
preference or request for a certain medium of payment and compliance
with such request or preference does not of itself constitute payment
because the creditor is said to have elected to take a security instead of
cash, and when the check is dishonored the vendor may resort to his
Andrews-Cooper Lumber Co. v. Hayworth, 205 N. C. 585, 172 S. E. 183 (1934);
South v. Sisk, 205 N. C. 655, 172 S. E. 193 (1934) (delivery and acceptance of
check not payment in absence of agreement to that effect) ; Lloyd Mortgage Co. v.
Davis, 51 N. D. 336, 199 N. W. 869 (1924) ; Baker v. State Highway Dept., 166
S. C. 481, 165 S. E. 197 (1932); 3 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed.
1933) §1448.
Dille v. White, 132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906).
'Duncan v. Kimball, 70 U. S. 37, 18 L. ed. 50 (1865) ; Cheltenham Stone and
Gravel Co. v. Gates Iron Co., 124 Ill. 623, 16 N. E. 923 (1888); Dille v. White,
132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906).
6 Kinard v. First National Bank of Sylvester, 125 Ga. 228, 53 S. E. 1018 (1906)
(whether there is payment depends upon intention of parties).7 Downey v. Hicks, 55 U. S. 240, 14 L. ed. 404 (1852); Cochran v. Zahos, 286
Mass. 173, 189 N. E. 831 (1934).
'Kinard v. First National Bank of Sylvester, 125 Ga. 228, 53 S. E. 1018 (1906).
'Dille v. White, 132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906) (general rule applied even
where the person entitled to receive the money expresses a preference for its pay-
ment by check, but does not agree to assume the risk of its being honored) ; Wed-
dington v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co., 100 Mass. 422 (1868) (as part of original
contract of sale seller was to receive bills of exchange and on failure of drawee,
seller was permitted to recover price of goods from purchaser) ; Baumgardner v.
Henry, 131 Mich. 240, 91 N. W. 169 (1902) (see cases cited in opinion) ; National
Life Ins. Co. v. Goble, 51 Neb. 5, 70 N. W. 503 (1897) (insurance company notified
insured that premium due and requested remittance by bank draft, registered letter
or post office money order. Held, sending and accepting of draft and giving of
receipt did not constitute payment when draft not paid) ; Syracuse, B. & N. Ry.
Co. v. Collins, 1 Abb. N. C. 47 (N. Y. 1874), aff'd, 57 N. Y. 641 (1874) (Agent
of carrier expressed preference for check. Held, no agreement being shown that
the check was intended to be received as absolute payment, the carrier was entitled
to recover on the original consideration). A statement on the bill to "Please
remit by check at once," should not be construed to mean that a check is neces-
sarily desired. This is merely a matter of form and both parties probably under-
stand it as such. The statement means that some form of payment is wanted at
once.
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original claim on the ground that there has been a defeasance on which
it was taken.' o Other courts take the position that it is payment when
the creditor's proposal to use a particular medium is accepted" since
debtor, accepting such proposal, puts himself to the inconvenience, and,
perhaps adds expense, of affirmatively procuring a cashier's check.'
2
An unreasonably delay in presenting the check will operate as an abso-
lute payment, 13 but this question was not presented in the principal case.
The court in the principal case placed little weight upon the fact that
the check was stamped "paid" and the bank's books debited with the
amount of the check. It has been held that marking a check paid and
making an entry on books is not conclusive but is only evidence of pay-
ment for debts and obligations are not discharged by mere entries upon
books.14 At least one court, however, has said that a check is paid when
the drawee bank has merely marked it paid,15 and if the court in the
principal case had followed such rule then the check might well have
been considered paid.
At first sight, it would seem to be a harsh rule that places the burden
"Hodgson v. Barrett, 33 Ohio St. 63, 68 (1877).
Corbit v. Bank of Smyra, 2 Harr. 235, 30 Am. Dec. 635 (Del. 1837) (in case
of contemporaneous debts the notes operate as payment, and are held to be the
same as money, and the risk of the solvency of the maker of the note is upon the
person receiving, for no debt strictly is created; no credit is given to the person,
but it is'given to the note accepted; it is a4 sale or exchange) ; Cowen v. Indian-
apolis Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 814, 157 So. 180 (1934) (request for medium of pay-
ment followed by acceptance constitutes payment) ; Martin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.,
30 N. M. 400, 234 Pac. 673 (1923) (insurance company notifying debtor that
premium due and requesting payment by draft or check is held to have agreed to
accept such commercial paper as payment and settlement of the premium due) ;
Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Barrow, 189 N. C.-303, 127 S. E. 3 (1925)
(jury found upon competent evidence that plaintiff instructed defendants to send
cashier's check in payment of debt and defendants having complied with the in-
structions are no longer liable).
SCowen v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 814, 157 So. 180 (1934).
Kraetsch v. City of Chicago, 198 Ill. App. 395 (1916) ( a reasonable time or
due diligence requires presentment of cashier's check for payment on the same
day, or at the furthest, within banking hours on the next day after the check is
delivered to it) ; Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Barrow, 189 N. C. 303, 127
S. E. 3 (1925) ; Lloyd Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 51 N. D. 336, 199 N. W. 869 (1924)
(acceptance of check implies understanding to present it for payment within a
reasonable time, which depends upon the circumstances of each case, in determin-
ing which the time, mode, and place of receiving the check and the relation of the
parties should be considered); Notes (1928) 26 MIcH. L. Rmv. 930; (1930) 29
Micir. L. Rav. 244; (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rlv. 444.
"Kinard v. First National Bank of Sylvester, 125 Ga. 228, 53 S. E. 1018
(1906) (marking of not paid is not sufficient; whether there is payment depends
upon intention of parties) ; Interstate Nat. Bank v. Ringo, 72 Kan. 116, 83 Pac.
119 (1905) (credits given on account do not show absolute payment) ; Graham v.
Procterville Warehouse, 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925); Dewey Bros. v.
Margolis & Brooks, 195 N. C. 307, 142 S. E. 22 (1928) ; Raines v. Grantham, 205
N. C. 340, 171 S. E. 360 (1933).
" Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank of So. Weymouth, 184 Mass.
49, 69 N. E. 670 (1903) ; (1932) 30 MIcH. L. REv. 962 (see on problem of pay-
ment generally).
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of risk on creditor requesting a certain form of payment; especially so,
when it is certainly not his intent to accept such medium as absolute
payment but only as payment conditional upon actual payment of the
check or other medium of payment. This is even more true when in
most cases the trend of the law governing checks and bank collections
is found to be in the direction of giving adequate protection to payees,
either by continuing the drawer's liability or allowing a preference in
the insolvent's assets.'. It may well be said, however, that by such a
request the creditor imposes the risk upon himself and is estopped to
deny that drawer is discharged by compliance with the request. Where
a way of payment is prescribed it must be followed,17 and since this
may cause the debtor to go to added trouble and expense he should not
be further liable. In the present case the reason given for holding that
payment was intended was the fact that defendant-manufacturer stated
that every "driveaway" must be settled for 'by cashier's check before
cars would be delivered, this language seeming to state more than a mere
request.
In view of the uncertainty of a jury finding the creditor should
stipulate in his contract that check or other requested medium of pay-
ment is taken subject to collection as is done by banks in their deposit
slips' 8 and 'by some insurance companies in their policies' 0 and notifica-
tion forms.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Practice and Procedure-Raising Affirmative
Defenses by Demurrer.
In an action to recover damages sustained by plaintiff when he
entered defendant's store as an invitee and fell down an elevator shaft
at the rear entrance of defendant's building, plaintiff alleged that de-
fendant had maintained an elevator to the right of the entrance, and that
without knowledge of plaintiff moved the entrance so as to place it in
front of the elevator and that plaintiff upon entering pulled open and
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §218 (c) (14) (order and preference in
distribution of insolvent bank's assets: (4) certified checks and cashier's checks in
the hands of a third party as a holder for value). Old Company's Lehigh, Inc.
v. Meeker et al., 294 U. S. 227, 55 Sup. Ct. 392, 79 L. ed. 876 (1935) (statute al-
lowing preferred claim does not apply to National banks); (1930) 8 N. C. L.
REv. 197, 198; (1933) 19 IovA L. REv. 90 (preference given).
'Swift v. New York, 83 N. Y. 528, 533 (1881).
Quarles v. Taylor and Co., 195 N. C. 313, 142 S. E. 25 (1928) (stipulation
read all items accepted at depositor's risk, until we have received final actual
payment).
"" Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 296 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924);
Hoar v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 118 App. Div. 416, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1059
(1907) (policy forfeited if note or check previously given was not paid).
